CONFIDENTIAL

HANDLING INDICATOR

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

For Department Use Only
761.00 (W)/10-2761

FROM : American Embassy, MOSCOW

352 NO.

OCT 27 1961

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

October 27, 1961 DATE

REF : B/FAC-1 S/P-1 S/S-1 ACDA-10 S/AE-4

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	INFO	OEPT	RM/R	REP	AF	ARA	EUR	FE	NEA	CU	INR	E	P	IO	ICA
	INR-10			2	1	5	4	5	4	4	5			3		11
			OTHER	AGR	COM	FRB	INT	LAB	TAR	TR	XMB					
				2	2			2		2						
	REC'D 11-1			AIR	ARMY	CIA	NAVY	OSD	OCB	USIA						
				15	35	16	20	2		11	4	1				

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 43

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECD 2 RM 4 59

INDEX

EXTERNAL - POLITICAL

1. Chou En-lai Criticizes Khrushchev Speech and Departs from Party Congress
2. Reactions of Other Communist Parties to the Albanian Issue
3. Malinovsky Party Speech
4. Gromyko Speech
5. Foreign Delegation Speeches
   - Ghana
   - Mali
   - Iraq
   - Syria
   - Argentina
6. Nuclear Testing

INTERNAL - POLITICAL

7. XXII CPSU Congress

MILITARY

Negative

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY [illegible] DATE 2/23/84
RDS☐or XDS☐EXT. DATE
TS AUTH. [illegible]
ENDORSE EXISTING [illegible]
DECLASSIFY☒ RELEASABLE☒
RELEASE DENIED☐
PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS

FILED DEC 22 84 32 PM '61

CGleysteen/KBJenkins/
ADubs/RTDavies/
JDHemenway:hp

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM 6-61 FS-439 GPO 912596 REPORTER

For Department Use Only - To be filled in on Yellow Original ONLY

ACTION ASSIGNED TO: Hulbert	ACTION TAKEN Noted	
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL DeCaire CS	DATE OF ACTION 11/14/61	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R File

CLASSIFIED FILE

EXTERNAL - POLITICAL

1. Chou En-lai criticizes Khrushchev Speech and Departs from Party Congress. In his address to the CPSU Congress, as head of the Chinese Communist delegation, Chou En-lai said that "open and one-sided" criticism of one party by another was not a Marxist-Leninist approach to intra-party disagreements and damaged bloc unity. Although Chou did not mention Khrushchev or the Albanians, this criticism was obviously levelled at Khrushchev's October 17 speech.

Chou En-lai departed from Moscow on October 23, leaving Peng Chen as acting head of the Chinese delegation. The Soviet press said that Chou left in connection with a forthcoming session of the All-China Conference of Peoples Representatives. The rest of the Chinese Communist delegation went to Leningrad on October 25, ostensibly on a sight-seeing trip. These departures underlined the criticism of Khrushchev in Chou's speech at the Congress.

The fact that Khrushchev brought the intra-bloc ideological dispute into the open, although concentrating fire of the Albanians and avoiding any direct criticism of the Chinese, raised important questions about the cohesion and future prospects of the Communist international movement.

2. Reactions of Other Communist Parties to the Albanian Issue. Leaders of delegations of foreign communist parties addressed the CPSU Congress, with minor exceptions, in the order in which they were introduced by Khrushchev at the opening session on October 17. Gomulka, considered to be the principal non-Soviet henchman of Khrushchev in the ideological dispute, immediately followed Chou En-lai and led off with an attack on the Albanians as apostates. This approach was adopted by all the other Eastern European communist party leaders, by the Outer Mongolian, Tsedenbal, and by most West European, Near Eastern, and Western hemisphere communist party spokesmen. Kim Il-sung generally supported the Soviet position but avoided explicit censure of the Albanians, and Ho Chi-minh adopted a position of neutrality. Although the speeches of many Asian party delegates reflected a concern not to offend the Communist Chinese, not one speaker at the Congress openly supported Chou En-lai by taking issue with the manner in which Khrushchev is dealing with the Albanian problem.

The British, Canadian, and Scandinavian communist representatives ignored the subject of Albania, thus taking a different position from most bloc and Western communist parties. This may signify some disagreement with Khrushchev's methods or might simply reflect sensitivity to domestic charges of blind obedience to Moscow. The US Communist Party representative, however, dutifully supported the Soviets.

3. Malinovsky Party Speech. While Defense Minister Malinovsky's speech of October 23 before the Party Congress was less blustering in tone than an article he had written for Pravda in September, his address nevertheless placed great emphasis on the build-up of rocket forces, the high state of readiness of Soviet conventional infantry and artillery, Soviet air transport capabilities, and the attention being given to anti-missile and anti-aircraft defenses.

In addition to claiming that the Soviet Union had nuclear submarines armed with nuclear rockets, Malinovsky stated that the problem of destroying rockets in flight "has also been solved." In general, the speech was cast to contrast the posture of Soviet military might and readiness to use it if necessary, with an alleged vulnerability of the capitalist powers to nuclear war. However, he did express agreement with a statement by President Kennedy that the US and USSR both have power to destroy each other.

On matters of doctrine, Malinovsky again precluded the possibility of limiting local wars to tactical nuclear weapons and reiterated the view that while war was not fatally inevitable, the danger of war would exist so long as imperialism exists.

4. Gromyko Speech. The Soviet Foreign Minister's address on October 25 was unusually moderate and almost statesman-like in tone, and emphasized a positive outlook for a negotiated settlement of the Berlin question. Gromyko avoided sabre-rattling, and claimed that Western reporters have misinterpreted Malinovsky's speech as belligerent. He spoke approvingly of USSR-US bilateral dealings as a realistic way to resolve East-West differences. In this connection Gromyko described the US and Soviet Union as "the two giants," evoked positive symbols of Soviet propaganda on US-USSR relations, such as the state of these relations under Roosevelt, war-time cooperation, and the meeting of American and Soviet troops on the Elbe.

His speech was permeated with praise of Khrushchev's personal diplomacy, and clearly was designed to justify the improvement of relations with the uncommitted nations and the avoidance of nuclear war by summit-level diplomatic efforts.

On Berlin Gromyko repeated Khrushchev's positive evaluation of Gromyko's bilateral talks in Washington and London, and reiterated Khrushchev's statement that a fruitful basis for negotiations exists. However, he repeated Soviet determination to conclude a separate peace treaty if necessary, and gave an historical justification for the Soviet fear of German militarism and for maintaining the division of Germany as a guarantee against this threat.

5. Foreign Delegation Speeches.

Ghana. Yebenezer Kwey gave a short, innocuous speech which was devoid of any references to foreign policy issues, including the topics of imperialism and colonialism.

Mali. Titiyani Traore, Politburo member of the governing Sudanese Union Party of Mali, characterized the Soviet Union as the basic guarantor of peace and praised the Soviets for their effective and "disinterested" aid and their support in the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggle.

Iraq. Salam Adil complimented the present regime in Iraq for positions taken on foreign policy issues but criticized it severely for alleged "anti-democratic" activities, including the prohibition of legal activities by the Communist Party of Iraq and the failure to free democrats and Communists who had struggled against imperialist forces.

Syria. Haled Bagdash associated his party with the non-alignment policy of the new regime in matters affecting foreign policy. On internal matters, he demanded the release of jailed labor leaders and communists and warned that the future stability of the country would in large measure depend upon whether or not genuine free elections are carried out. Bagdash was sharply critical of the "repressive measures" carried out by the UAR during the reunification period but expressed hope for the restoration of good relations between Syria and Egypt on the basis of friendship and fraternal solidarity in the struggle against imperialism.

Argentina. Argentine delegate Kodovilla denounced the Alliance for Progress and the International Monetary Fund as vehicles of US neo-colonialism, and sharply attacked President Frondizi for capitulating to American imperialism" and promoting anti-communist legislation. He warned that if paths of legal struggle were closed, the workers of Argentina will be forced into a non-peaceful struggle.

6. Nuclear Testing. As of October 26, the Soviet press had carried no word regarding the high-yield nuclear test at Novaya Zemlya.

INTERNAL - POLITICAL

7. XXII CPSU Congress. Khrushchev's introduction at the "Congress of the Builders of Communism" of two discordant themes -- the deviation of the Albanian Communist Party and the crimes of the Soviet anti-party group -- have precipitated questions whose answers may remain unclear even after the Congress closes. The objective pursued by Khrushchev by precipitating discussion on these two subjects (and by permitting himself to be portrayed in most glowing terms yet recorded) seemed clear enough: to reassert the supremacy of the USSR within the international Communist movement and the supremacy of Khrushchev and his policies within the USSR. The motivations behind Khrushchev's actions and the likely repercussions seemed far less clear.

The most striking aspect of the Congress has been the caution with which the attack on the "anti-Party group" has been mounted (Embtel 1342). The gravity of the attack has steadily mounted, but it is apparent from the treatment given this material by Soviet public media that there has been a considered effort not to go too fast or too far without testing reaction to what has already been said.

The treatment of VOROSHILOV, who had been elected to the Congress Presidium, has been particularly interesting, no doubt because he was the only member of the "group" who had not been publicly accused earlier of belonging to it and because he enjoys a certain popularity among Party cadres and the Soviet public as an old and hitherto blameless Bolshevik. In the "Secret Speech" at the XX CPSU Congress, he was depicted by Khrushchev with some sympathy as having been victimized by STALIN -- although Khrushchev then also suggested he write the "truth" about Stalin's activities during the Civil War; something Voroshilov is not known to have done. The same sort of gradual approach was employed during the first few days of the Congress in the case

seemed
of MOLOTOV, but by October 23 it was clear Khrushchev aimed to exclude him from the Party, together with MALENKOV and KAGANOVICH... The campaign against Voroshilov has proceeded by fits and starts. Sometimes he is linked directly with the troika Malenkov-Kaganovich-Molotov; at other times, he is not mentioned together with them. On October 23, POLYANSKY said he must bear full responsibility for his anti-Party deeds; he was not, however, called upon to answer for his crimes "before the Party and the people," the formula applied to the troika.

The lengths to which Khrushchev is prepared to go in order to finish off the "anti-Party group" became clear on October 24, when SHVERNIK began to use material from the NKVD files to connect Kaganovich and Molotov with YEZHOV and BERIYA and indict them for their part in the 1937-1938 Party purges. Co-incidentally, unfavorable references to STALIN, which earlier had been rare and subsidiary, began to rise. SATYUKOV, on October 25, began to surface material from the "Secret Speech" when he referred to Molotov's part in the "repressions" directed against RUDZUTAK and CHUBAR'. Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB) SHELEPIN carried this process a step further on October 26, naming as victims of the Yezhovshchina not only Rudzutak and Chubar', but POSTYSHEV, KOSSIOR, EIKHE, KRYLENKO, UNSHLIKHT, and BUBNOV, as well as other lesser figures who had apparently not been named by Khrushchev in the "Secret Speech."

Shelepin linked Voroshilov with the troika, adding, however, that it was good "Comrade Voroshilov had realized his mistakes in time." Meanwhile, (October 24), Agitprop Chief IL'ICHEV had indicated a way out for the lesser members of the "group": "If these people still consider themselves members of the Party ..., they must tell the Party that experience and the years have proven their positions deeply harmful and in error." Confession may therefore be the way to salvation for Voroshilov, Bulganin, and the others. A report circulated in Moscow that Voroshilov would address the Congress, and there were rumors Bulganin and Shepilov ("who joined them") would also be heard.

The Khrushchev cult continued to grow, to the point that speakers were calling Khrushchev the "principal creator" of the Party Program, which in turn was frequently referred to as "Leninist." Khrushchev was also "our first Communist" (Shvernik), and the title "First secretary of the Central Committee," with "First" capitalized, appeared in the published texts of some speakers. This had been done during earlier attempts to make Khrushchev appear as Number One.

The cult was particularly pronounced during the early part of the week, with Khrushchev pictured in the press in the company of Old Bolsheviks, the Moscow Party delegation, and the Armed Forces delegation. On October 24, Il'ichev made an interesting distinction between the "cult of the personality" and the "Leninist instructions on the question of the authority of leaders," saying the Party was "doing everything in order to exclude the possibility of the cult of personality," but would defend "the authority of leaders truly dedicated to the Party and the people."

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL
(Classification)

MILITARY

Negative

DECLASSIFIED

For the Ambassador:

Boris H. Klosson

Boris H. Klosson
Counselor for Political Affairs

ibution by Embassy: Bonn, Seoul, Prague, Warsaw, Belgrade, Budapest, Bu[illegible]est, Ankara, Bern, Brussels, Helsinki, Stockholm, London, Kabul, Oslo, Rome, Paris, Sofia, Vienna, Tehran, Tokyo, Copenhagen, Geneva, Istanbul, Munich, Frankfurt, Cairo, Berlin, Hong Kong, USEUCOM, SETAF, USAREUR, CINCNELM (REAR ECHELON), USCINCEUR, CINCPAC, USCINCSOUTH, CINCSAFE, CINCUSARPAC, USARAL, DET."R" DA.

CONFIDENTIAL